What to Do in Times of Destabilization? by Prof. Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse

Times of Chaos…

In a period of deep destabilization of the geopolitical system on both a regional and global scale, a fundamental question arises about the possibilities of restoring international order. In the third decade of the 21st century, the world entered a period of disintegration of the existing system known as “Pax Americana.” This resulted primarily from the weakening of the existing global hegemon – which had maintained balance in many regions of the world, including Europe. The U.S. military presence on the Old Continent after World War II was a significant condition for geopolitical stabilization, primarily protecting allies from the Russian threat (and the Soviet threat during the Cold War), but also from excessive German power. It should be remembered that it was the growth of the latter power, as well as Berlin’s imperial ambitions, that caused World War I and World War II. The announcement of a partial U.S. withdrawal from military presence in Europe, as well as from responsibility for European security, thus had to be one of the factors of destabilization. It accelerated Russia’s imperial reclaiming of its former sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe. With the outbreak of a full-scale war on the borders of the EU and NATO, the Old Continent entered a phase of full geopolitical destabilization. And the European states of the “collective West”—that is, the European members of NATO and the EU—found themselves de facto in a state of undeclared war with Russia. This was a hybrid conflict, but one with enormous consequences for security and leading to further escalation.

The U.S. problems stemmed from the depletion of American resources and the need to focus Washington’s strategy on its main priorities. These included competition with China and an attempt to strengthen control over its own sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere. They were the result of a phenomenon sometimes referred to as “imperial overstretch” or “hegemonic overreach”—that is, excessively broad engagement by the dominant power, primarily as a result of successive military interventions and the depletion of financial and economic resources. The shrinking of U.S. resources, combined with mounting challenges and growing rivals, mainly China, caused a change in Washington’s strategy during Donald Trump’s second presidency. From a benign hegemony open to the needs of allies, both military and economic, it turned into a “predatory hegemony” that aggressively defended its own interests—very often at the expense of allies. The slogan “America First” exposed the geo-economic weakening of the United States, which in the name of this motto demanded a fairer distribution of benefits and obligations between the leader of the collective West and its allies, including in NATO. Such an approach led to selfish behavior by the leader. By shifting more and more of the costs resulting from geopolitical destabilization onto its partners, it effectively undermined allied relations. And without the support of its allies, the United States became even weaker in the face of revisionist states that actively challenged Western dominance, the “Pax Americana” system, and even economic globalization—which had until then been promoted by Western institutions and entities led by American corporations. An element of destroying the Western order was, for example, the radical U.S. turn toward protectionism and departure from the liberal values it had previously promoted, moreover not only in the sphere of economic order. This was the paradox of the U.S.’s “predatory” and more selfish policy. The “America First” policy, instead of strengthening, actually weakened Washington’s global position.

Added to this was a radical loss of credibility by the United States. The United States was ceasing to guarantee peace and stability, both in the global and regional frameworks. It was losing agency and thus credibility. It was unable to restore stabilization on terms favorable to its local allies. Examples included attempts to conclude peace or freeze conflicts with regional geopolitical rivals in Europe or the Middle East. These took place amid a drastic deterioration of the security of regional allies (European NATO members, Ukraine, and Israel). This led not only to a crisis of trust among allies but also to actions aimed at making their own security independent of U.S. help. It thus led to the autonomization of allies, to their striving for “strategic autonomy” vis-à-vis America. This is another paradox. The Americans were effectively helping to build “strategic autonomy” in the EU, although they had previously consistently contested it. Thus, the actions of the Trump administration undermined previous allied relations, as well as the institutions that embodied those relations. In Europe’s case, this concerned the weakening of NATO’s cohesion and allied guarantees under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. All the more so because the U.S. President repeatedly disparaged the need for and usefulness of this security organization, of which America had until then been the undisputed leader. This was one of many manifestations of the destruction of the existing international order by Washington.

In this way, America was destroying its own “Pax Americana” system, without even attempting to create anything better in its place. It is therefore difficult to regard Trump’s actions as having the specificity of “creative destruction” described by Joseph Schumpeter. Destruction was indeed present, but without an attempt to create an alternative system. Therefore, the possibilities of returning to the post-war Western order were becoming increasingly difficult. This resembled the famous “Kindleberger trap”—a term introduced by Joseph Nye. It is a situation of a kind of hegemonic vacuum at the global level, which is exploited by regional forces to independently change geopolitical arrangements to their advantage. André Sapir of the Bruegel think tank stated that this inevitably leads to a collapse of international cooperation, and thus chaos.

Under such conditions, it is difficult to expect that the international situation will be stabilized in the future based on a bipolar order, i.e., two blocs: American and Chinese. Even leading American geopoliticians, for example Hal Brands, were skeptical of such a scenario. The American bloc was increasingly falling apart, while the Chinese one was, for the time being, only in an embryonic form. The Middle Kingdom did not want to take responsibility for stabilizing the international system, especially for maintaining “Pax Americana.” Rather, it focused its efforts on dismantling it and maximally exhausting the forces of Western states. An element of the weakening of the collective West was therefore dragging the U.S. and its allies into regional conflicts and prolonging them over time by Beijing. Moreover, the hitherto dominant West was afflicted by a double weakness—that of America and Europe simultaneously. In the latter case, I mean primarily the European Union. An additional element of trouble was the numerous misunderstandings, economic and geopolitical disputes between partners on both sides of the Atlantic.

The world was sinking into chaos. Its manifestation was the quite widespread illusion within the European Union about the shaping of a multipolar order. This was how the loss of hegemony by the U.S. was described, while deluding oneself that a stable order based on several strong geopolitical centers, including the EU, was taking its place. Meanwhile, the entire West was weakening. Not only America, but also Europe. This was evidenced by successive EU crises and their inept attempts at resolution, described in detail by me in the book entitled “Steering the Titanic.” Not only the EU, but also the leading states of Western Europe were increasingly losing importance on the international stage. In Europe, a uniform and strong geopolitical pole, supposedly meant to replace the American one, was not emerging; rather, at least four capitals were vying for the status of poles: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, and London. Each was struggling with numerous problems and was actually losing geopolitical significance.

As I have already mentioned, the lack of a global hegemon or “global policeman” stabilizing the situation led to increasing chaos. Its manifestation was regional conflicts. They can be described as regional imperial wars, often serving as proxy conflicts. The deepening chaos and anarchy of international relations provoked imperial forces to boldly enter armed conflicts. This was the case with Russia in Europe, but also with Iran and, to some extent, Israel in the Middle East. At the same time, these were proxy-type conflicts, as in the background there was always the global rivalry between China and the Western world, primarily the United States. So, instead of stabilization based on a multipolar system, we were dealing with an escalation of regional conflicts and a struggle for regional hegemony. In this way, the growing geopolitical vacuum at the global level and the deepening rivalry for leadership between Beijing and Washington stimulated increasingly strong regional destabilization—in many places around the world simultaneously. This somewhat resembles a patchwork world, i.e., the scenario of “dispersed multipolarity” described in the report “Quarter-Century of the Turning Point” by the INFO OPS Polska Foundation (from 2026). The dominant feature of the international system in the current phase of destabilization is chaos, erosion of regulations and international institutions. Multipolarity merely conceals the lack of a global hegemon and increasingly fierce regional rivalry. At least, this was the view of Henry Kissinger.

How, in this situation, can the geopolitical situation in Europe be stabilized? What attempts at such stabilization are being made, mainly by the elites of Western Europe, who had the greatest influence on the situation on the Old Continent? Can they succeed? These are the main research questions of this essay.

How to Calm the Situation in Europe?

The stabilization of Europe after World War II was largely carried out by the global hegemonic power, i.e., the USA. Currently, the United States is partially withdrawing from Europe and partially transferring responsibility for security to the Europeans themselves. An additional challenge is Washington’s rivalry with Beijing for global primacy. This is not only a source of destabilization in Europe but may also suggest that stabilization here cannot be achieved without ordering the geopolitical situation at the global level. So, under these conditions, can Western Europe alone bring about a calming of the situation in the region? It must contend not only with Russian revanchism and Sino-American rivalry, but also with numerous internal problems.

The dominant EU states of Western Europe, as well as EU institutions, have repeatedly presented bold strategic plans. These were related to governance reforms towards centralization, statism, and political consolidation at the EU (Brussels) level. At the same time, these plans have recently concerned primarily the sphere of security and foreign policy. EU technocracy and judges have for many years strived for deeper integration, especially during successive crises. This was accomplished through the practice of functioning EU institutions, i.e., by the method of “small steps” and “fait accompli,” as well as through judicial activism. Member states generally agreed to all these actions, which led to the strengthening of the central power center in Brussels. Nevertheless, they were increasingly reluctant towards a groundbreaking treaty change. In other words—the governments in the most politically influential parts of Western Europe wanted to respond to crises and geopolitical destabilization, but these were often only declarations not backed by more decisive actions. The Union was struggling with decision-making paralysis, which meant it was unable to effectively implement strategic plans, including those concerning the remediation of EU governance and counteracting increasingly frequent crises. Thus, an increasingly glaring discrepancy arose between grand ambitions (and the rhetorical sphere) and the inertia of the real sphere. That is why the largest regional actors, led by Germany, reduced expectations regarding EU reforms.

Their ambitions for institutional change were basically limited only to streamlining the decision-making process in the area of EU foreign and defense policy, as well as offering an incomplete albeit accelerated enlargement process for Ukraine and the Balkan states. This “incomplete membership” mainly concerned the suspension of political rights, especially decision-making rights for new members. In the case of shifting more matters to qualified majority voting (in the Union’s intergovernmental institutions), the main aim was to increase Germany’s control over the foreign and defense policy of states considered peripheral, especially from Central Europe. In turn, accelerated accession was intended to expand Germany’s geo-economic sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, while simultaneously limiting the influence of non-EU powers in these areas. Moreover, depriving new members of some political rights—at least for a certain period—was intended to facilitate the dependence of these states on the geopolitical center in Western Europe.

Berlin also minimized its involvement in building strong EU instruments (e.g., fiscal ones), as well as its own participation in some EU programs. It thus did not want to bear the costs of strengthening the EU, while at the same time minimizing the possibilities of its own state being overly bound by EU law, procedures, and instruments, especially in the sphere of security, which is crucial in times of geopolitical uncertainty. Probably for this reason, Germany did not join the SAFE instrument, i.e., the EU loan intended for the military needs of member states, but encumbered with numerous administrative procedures and significant discretionary power on the part of EU officials.

The FRG still wanted to use EU instruments to control and increase the geo-economic dependence of peripheral states, while simultaneously increasing its own independence from the EU in the sphere of security. The perspective of smaller states with peripheral status, such as Poland, was completely different. Successive centralizing actions in the EU caused them to lose political influence on EU decisions, while at the same time being increasingly tightly bound by them, which increased their geo-economic dependence on Western Europe. Tighter binding of peripheral states to the EU center did not mean an improvement in the geostrategic position of the EU itself and its most influential states from the western part of the continent. They remained weak and vulnerable to crises, and their ability to stabilize the geopolitical situation in the region was severely limited.

Therefore, the basic scenario for Western European elites—similarly to the Trump administration’s approach—was a reset with Russia. The aim was to achieve geopolitical stabilization through diplomatic talks with Moscow. Arming and financing Ukraine, as well as modernizing the military potential and defense industry in EU member states, was essentially not meant to prepare the EU side for a real military conflict with Russia, but only to exert pressure on it to improve the terms for Western Europe during a negotiated compromise. Such a solution, although desired by the elites of the western part of the continent, did not mean, however, lasting geopolitical stabilization, but at best only a temporary suspension of disputes. Moreover, Russian experts—from the largest state bank (Sberbank of Russia)—assessed in April 2026 the chances of ending the war in Ukraine at around 30%, and only in the event of serious exhaustion on both sides and external pressure, primarily from the USA and China.

Therefore, the second potential scenario was the continuation of the war, which would inevitably lead to its potential escalation. A further radical deterioration of the geopolitical situation and a transition from hybrid war to open conflict between European NATO states and Russia is thus likely. This would essentially be not only a rivalry over Eastern Europe (i.e., mainly Ukraine), but over the Baltic states and Central Europe. The dispute would be between Russia and the collective West over the geopolitical future of the Old Continent. The backdrop for this conflict would be, to a large extent, the historical dispute over dominance in Central and Eastern Europe between the traditional adversaries, i.e., Russia and Germany, although in the latter case supported by NATO and EU structures and member states. This second scenario would likely trigger another area of conflict, namely violent internal tensions in Western Europe fueled by Moscow. I mean the escalation of cultural and political conflicts between the native population and non-European immigrants and their descendants. Russia would undoubtedly fuel such conflicts, in line with its previous long-standing practice of using migration pressure to destabilize the EU. This is precisely why EU and member state migration policy was such a sensitive issue.

Summary and Recommendations

In the third decade of the 21st century, the international situation was entering a prolonged period of destabilization as a result of the erosion of hegemonic power at the global level, as well as the rivalry for primacy between the USA and China. As a result, various regions of the world, including Europe, were entering a period of imperial proxy wars. Western Europe only planned limited changes to the functioning of the EU, which did not resolve the dysfunctionality of this organization, but was only intended to increase geo-economic control over the peripheries. The most likely geopolitical scenarios were a temporary attempt to suspend the conflict with Russia or its further escalation.

Both mentioned baseline scenarios are difficult for Central Europe, which is largely treated in an objectifying manner by decision-makers from Western Europe. Earlier, I mentioned the “reform” plans in the EU, which largely weaken the political influence of Central European states in this organization, as well as increase the Union’s control over these peripheral countries and their geo-economic dependence on the western part of the continent. The largest states of Western Europe, primarily Germany, wish to strengthen control over Central Europe in the sphere of security, although the perspective of geopolitical threats is fundamentally different in both parts of the EU, i.e., its western and eastern parts. This means that any concessions by Western Europe to Russia may come at the expense of states that are less politically influential and have peripheral status in the EU. In the case of a reset with Russia, the states of Central Europe have no chance of improving their international position, and their fate will be decided in talks between Russia and the largest states of Western Europe, probably with U.S. participation. In the scenario of military escalation, Central Europe will be the main battlefield, with all its negative consequences. Taking this into account, Polish political elites should prepare in advance for both of these scenarios, which in my opinion are the most likely in 2026.

The most important challenge is for Poland to break its peripheral status in the EU, as well as to move away from the practice of making the most important decisions about the future of Central Europe without the participation of its representatives—that is, largely by the states of Western Europe with varying degrees of American involvement. Regaining subjectivity and agency in international relations for Poland and other Central European states will not be easy, however. This is determined by the political culture prevailing in these countries, the habit of political elites to delegate their own interests in the sphere of security and foreign policy to Western allies, and the associated passivity of Central European elites in international relations. To rebuild international standing and agency in foreign and defense policy, a strong state, economy, and prudent alliances are essential. A far-reaching strategy and active foreign and defense policy are necessary. In order to strive for agency on the international stage, the autonomy of one’s own army must be built, which must be based on a national defense industry and own technologies. Arms purchases—although necessary in the current situation—must in each case aim at the greatest possible autonomy in using the purchased equipment and the ability to service it and, as far as possible, produce it on the territory of the Republic of Poland.

As I mentioned, the challenge is to break the peripherality within the EU and too strong geo-economic dependence on the western part of the continent, primarily on Germany. The processes increasing this dependence should be stopped, as well as the possibilities for further shifting various costs onto Poland by the dominant states of Western Europe in the most sensitive policies, primarily climate and energy, migration, as well as in the sphere of security and defense. This also applies to plans for political consolidation in the EU, which may take place at the expense of Polish interests and geopolitical freedom. Therefore, Poland should not support such “reforms.” Polish policy in the EU thus requires a radical increase in assertiveness, as well as ceasing to delegate responsibility for key areas of public policy to EU institutions or to the largest states of Western Europe.

Polish foreign and defense policy must once again increase its activity and orientation towards strategic goals. This means primarily rebuilding relations with Ukraine and actively promoting cooperation with the states of the eastern flank, starting from Finland and Sweden and ending with Turkey. It is not enough to rely solely on allies from Western Europe (mainly Germany, France, and the United Kingdom)—which seemed to be the main goal of the foreign policy of Donald Tusk’s government (from December 13, 2023). Transatlantic relations should not be neglected either, although one should strive to be guided in them primarily by the implementation of specific undertakings serving Polish strategic interests. The aim is to persuade the American ally to support the Polish geostrategic perspective.

During Trump’s second presidency, the Americans were inclined towards a reset with Russia, and during Joe Biden’s administration, they largely delegated their own interests in the sphere of security to Germany. Nevertheless, earlier, during Trump’s first presidency, they supported integration in Central Europe and the Balkans, i.e., they supported the Three Seas Initiative. Among these variants of U.S. European policy, the best option for Poland is supporting the autonomy of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic and Balkan states. The strategic option of Intermarium is not only the most beneficial for the states of the aforementioned region but also for the geopolitical stabilization of the continent. It builds a buffer against Russian expansionism, and moreover minimizes Berlin’s ambitions, not only regarding dominance in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans but consequently also in the western and southern parts of the continent. For those interested in this issue, I refer to the in-depth analysis in my book “Intermarium. Geopolitics – Geo-economics – Geoculture.”

The best option for lasting stabilization of the geopolitical situation in Europe is therefore to build a strong Intermarium—by the interested states, particularly Poland and Ukraine. Obviously, such an option is unacceptable to Russia and Germany, which will actively oppose it. For this reason, the support of a global power would be essential for the implementation of such a strategic vision. In turn, allowing Berlin’s or Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions to be fulfilled leads to further instability. In such a case, the chances of restoring order on the continent would be long-lasting and come at a high cost to all parties. Particularly painful for the states of Intermarium.