Geopolitical Challenges of the Hot July 2026

A conversation between Prof. Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse and Jacek Bartosiak

Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse: Welcome to the renowned Polish strategist Jacek Bartosiak. I’ll get straight to the first question. In a famous article, American geopolitician Hal Brands outlined three scenarios for the development of the international situation. The first is two blocs, somewhat reminiscent of the Cold War arrangement – an American bloc and a Chinese bloc as the ultimate model. The second is regional imperial wars, which is de facto what we’re currently seeing in the Middle East and Europe. The third is a situation of chaos. Jack, what do you think? Which of these three scenarios is most likely for the near future?

Jacek Bartosiak: In my opinion, the first is the least likely. This is because the previous bipolar system, the Soviet-American one, took shape on the ruins of World War II and more or less followed the lines where Soviet and American soldiers were stationed. So there was no period of chaos. Moreover, the Soviet economy was not integrated into the global system of goods and services exchange, so no difficult ‘divorce’ was necessary – something that would be absolutely essential now. And given the specialization in supply chains and the globalized world, no one is sufficiently self-sufficient, no one is resilient enough to withstand a drastic severance of these chains.

So even moving towards a bipolar system would entail a long period of chaos – scenario number 3. So the most probable scenario is chaos, which in my view is happening right now.

Of course, if by chaos we understand the Kindleberger Trap[^1] – a security vacuum – then we will see attempts to form regional arrangements based on some community of risk or interest. This could range from voices emerging in Europe about creating a European system (which will be difficult), to even smaller local arrangements that might appear in the Gulf after the Iranian war. The Gulf states, which are rich and well-fed, sitting on oil and gas, might simply decide that paying off Iran is enough, securing their own peace. Iran will of course grow fatter and richer, but what does that matter to these smaller states as long as they have oil and gas? They won’t be going to any wars. For them, the most important thing is to transport their goods through the Strait of Hormuz.

However, it will be very difficult to distinguish between scenarios two and three, because the formation of local or regional alliances will also appear chaotic.

TGG: Exactly, I also think the two-bloc scenario will be hard to recreate because, as the name suggests, it relies on blocs – including the Western bloc – and the United States is doing a great deal to dismantle such a Western bloc. This leads to my next question. We are witnessing a shake-up in alliance credibility regarding the Middle East and Europe from the erstwhile global hegemon and godfather of the West – the United States. This signal goes not only to both mentioned regions but to the entire world. What should we do about the loss of US alliance credibility? Should we introduce hedging towards China, or strengthen lobbying in the United States?

JB: First and foremost, we should change our approach. In this context, we must realize that the primacy of the United States no longer exists. America’s global benign hegemony has collapsed, and the Americans have entered a phase of a predatory hegemon wherever they can. Where they cannot – for example, the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf – as it turns out, they have to back down and won’t even be a hegemon there, not even a predatory one. It remains an open question in how many other places they won’t be either. It seems to me they are no longer the hegemon in the war in Ukraine either, that is, in relations with Ukraine. The Polish state and its elites must answer a question they haven’t correctly answered yet: What to do when this primacy is gone? Thus, being welded to the alliance with the US – the belief that this alliance guarantees us rock-solid security – is already a very risky bet on the future. This affects our relations with Ukraine, makes it difficult to enter into proper relations with that country, and prevents a certain game in Europe. It also prevents the proper development of arms purchases and an adequate reform of the Polish Armed Forces. This is a problem. Of course, the Americans, returning to the first question, very much want to convince everyone that the best solution for Western people would be the formation of these two blocs, primarily because these blocs would serve them. They are unable to defeat China or force it to abandon its path to capitalism themselves and need Europe for that. They need, for example, European markets and European culture and geography, as well as other allies. So the Americans would very much like to create a bloc in the Rimland, in Eurasia, to contain China. Both militarily, of course, but primarily geo-economically – through a system of bloc-based economic and technological solutions so that China cannot find an outlet for its exports, access to certain technologies, joint ventures, or an outlet for its energy and productivity there. That would be a dream plan for the United States. The question remains: is this also a dream for the Italians, for the Spaniards, the Dutch, the Germans, the Poles, and so on in Europe, as well as in Asia? And here the situation is diametrically different from the Cold War situation with the Soviets. The Soviets, apart from ideology and some technological solutions for third-world countries, or certain socio-political ideas that might have been attractive to some backward societies, did not have a long-term development plan. So they were significantly poorer than the United States and did not produce modern goods. The US dominated. It was easy for the Americans to convince their European allies west of the Elbe to subordinate themselves to the then-American grand strategy of containing the Soviets and creating a bloc economic system, the so-called free world, the legacy of which includes various meetings like the G7. And it will not be easy to convince them now regarding China, because China, firstly, is the world’s main producer of goods; secondly, it is also a pioneer in some technologies, some domains, and new economic rivalries. We all need real Chinese production for our daily functioning. Moving away from that will be very difficult. American strategists would like this to happen, but they would only need to find someone who would produce cheaply for them, because they themselves don’t want to produce things cheaply. And this is a question about the wisdom of the American grand strategy and its strategy towards China in the current arrangement. I find only question marks here. I don’t hide that beyond ideas like letting go and retreating across the ocean – which would make sense for an American citizen, if I were one. Not for Poles perhaps, not for many in Europe or Asia, but for a large part of Americans it would make sense. I do not find a wise strategy in American conduct. I am unable to discern a wise strategy in this regard, unless they really, in Trump’s second term, are putting everything on one card – meaning the artificial intelligence revolution, pouring all resources into it and winning. I don’t see another comprehensive strategy; the fact that they are trying to paralyze Europe, subordinate it, including Ukraine, regulate the energy market along with the Russians – that’s a different matter. I don’t see such a comprehensive strategy for dealing with China.

TGG: The United States, through aggressive rather than benign hegemony, is actually straining alliances and, in this sense, is sawing off the branch it sits on. Because without alliances, it cannot maintain its influence in the global system. If it retreated to the Western Hemisphere, according to what Nicholas Spykman (1893–1943) and also Alfred Mahan (1840–1914) said, it would be the beginning of the end, because the defense of the Western Hemisphere is really only possible in the Pacific. You can’t withdraw because that would actually be a loss, not securing the rear. In short, the question is: will China become the next world hegemon and create a new system of stabilization in the global system, but also regionally, because ultimately it will stabilize the situation in individual regions?

JB: It seems to me that China will not become a global hegemon and we will no longer be dealing with the situation that the Americans – to their benefit and to the benefit of part of the world – had in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century. China will not be able to pursue such a decisive, almost imperial, global policy, given its powerful neighbors – Russia, India, numerous Central Asian states, Japan, Korea, or the entire ASEAN. The Americans, due to their geographical distance, had a unique opportunity to create a benign hegemony.

China embarking on such a path will result in tensions and they will not succeed. However, some regional hegemonic arrangements may emerge due to the gigantic power of the Chinese economy, especially if it continues unchecked. I would generally think that the peace that will come after the current systemic war, and its negotiation, will more resemble the negotiation of what happened in the Iranian-American war. It won’t be clear who won or lost; Hitler’s bunker wasn’t captured, no flag was hung on the Reichstag. There will be no such history. It will be something exhausted, some formula that, in my opinion, will not resemble the formula the Americans wanted in the age of globalization, even if the Americans won this war and created their own bloc. The Americans will not want this because they will remember that the previous system of openness under a benign hegemon led to the growth of a competitor – the seed of that system’s defeat lay in its openness. They will be afraid to allow it again because after such a hard war, which they barely won (they won’t win easily, if at all), they will not want to allow the creation of a new rival. And secondly, if they win, it won’t be as overwhelmingly as in World War II, so they won’t be able to impose a system as they did earlier in Bretton Woods. And this is also a memento for the Polish elites who would like the Americans to win and automatically assume, not only that the Americans will win (because they always win), but worse, they assume that if the Americans win, the system will be equally good for us, for the Poles. And they might, for example, win through an alliance with Russia. Or through completely pragmatic, opportunistic, various nervous moves that could throw us under the so-called bus. So blindly following America, “being welded to America,” is, however you put it in Polish, a bad strategy. We need to make our strategy more flexible. We cannot be so welded, because we have a significant chance of paying this or that price during a period of turmoil.

TGG: How to stabilize Europe? Will the current attempt at stabilization – firstly through the consolidation of the European Union, including in the area of foreign and defense policy, and secondly through a reset with Russia – succeed in your opinion? And are we even prepared for a reset with Russia?

JB: Those who perceive the need for change in Europe under the new geopolitical circumstances you refer to indeed mainly see the need for this change in the consolidation of Europe. After all, Europe must be big, it cannot be small, because only the big can do much, the small can do little. And the only method is, of course, bureaucratic consolidation, because more power in Brussels means more power – at least that’s how it seems to bureaucrats. Physicists wouldn’t necessarily agree. The second move of this consolidation reflex, especially among those who traditionally view American policy with suspicion, is an attempt to return to low energy prices – that is, coming to an agreement with Russia. This is an unconditional reflex. In my opinion, the first will be difficult to implement, the second will be easier (I’ll explain shortly), but more difficult than it might have seemed three, four, five, twelve years ago – I’ll also address that. I will also suggest what Europeans should do to approach this topic completely differently.

Historically, since the fall of the Roman Empire, consolidation in Europe has never succeeded because there are peripheral nations that rebel against this system. And it will be the same now. The Americans, moreover, will support the rebellion of these peripheral states, but not out of moral righteousness that Europe shouldn’t consolidate, but they will do it instrumentally so that Europe ultimately remains subordinate to the Americans. A divided Europe will be easier to subordinate. So the Americans will not be interested in consolidation, but rather in subordination. Therefore, our independence zealots cannot get excited that the Americans are supporting the breakup of Europe, because they are doing it for their own benefit, not for the benefit of those who talk so much about independence.

That’s one thing. The second thing is about Russia. In my opinion, the current war of Ukraine with Russia, supported by Western states including Poland, has shown that Russia can be defeated, and it currently looks like the Ukrainians will not lose this war (in the sense of losing their statehood). They have demonstrated the ability to weaken and destroy Russia. It seems to me that Ukrainians will not accept peace on Russia’s terms, and therefore it will be very difficult for Europeans to impose peace in this part of the world on terms other than effectively subordinating Russia and its energy resources. Paradoxically, the Ukrainian army works in favor of Poland and its grand strategy – despite all the disputes between us – because the Ukrainians, who are the only real armed force in Europe, will not accept anything that restores the subjectivity and profitability of the Russian Federation. Here lies a great opportunity for Polish policy: Russia could be definitively broken. Of course, there is a great chance for a reset with Russia due to certain habits. And these might force Ukraine to make concessions at some point. But for now, as we record this conversation at the end of June 2026, it seems to me that Ukrainians will not want to be forced. I see how the Ukrainians are planning, how they are now cutting off Crimea – because in Crimea there is no oil, no gasoline, gas stations are not working, you can’t buy groats, you can’t buy more than 3 kg of flour. They are very effectively isolating Crimea. They are hitting refineries; 25% less gasoline is available at Russian Federation stations, rationing has begun in 20 regions. In Moscow, there have been queues at gas stations for quite some time, and many have no fuel at all. And Russia is the world’s leading oil producer. The Ukrainians will now test their developed ballistic missiles on the range and say there could even be several hundred ballistic missiles in a few months, night after night hitting Moscow. Such is the scale of the Ukrainian new technology industry. And I personally am counting on that. Perhaps I’ve said too much about it, but every strategist has some hope.

As for Europe, I will speak only as a strategist, not as a politician, because strategy is above politics. With that assumption, I believe there are or will be politicians in Europe who can face this historical challenge. Ideally, it should be done by the German Chancellor. If he announced that the EU was what it was, and now we will only take cherry-picking – what we like. And whoever wants to join the German macroeconomic system is welcome. We remain only with the four freedoms of the European market. Whoever wants to cooperate within it is welcome. In particular, we invite the states of Central Europe, because we live well with them. And we also invite Ukraine for talks on agriculture. Returning to the basic four freedoms of the Union market releases more vital, developmental, and innovative forces. I would then also announce in a second sentence that to de-leverage the influence of Americans and Russians on the European continent, we have nothing against each state having nuclear weapons in Europe. This might seem a very risky stance. But let’s consider: is it really risky? After all, there are no significant territorial disputes between EU states, right? Nuclear weapons turned out not to be so easy for the Russians to use, right? Yet it equally de-leverages the political influence of Americans and Russians, because they wanted to use this patent to manage European energy. And Europeans have the technology to acquire nuclear weapons relatively quickly. This is a very, very radical approach, shattering the unity of the transatlantic world and annoying Americans and Russians, but in my opinion, it could succeed. Furthermore, I would invite the Turks into this game. Without them, Europe is, let’s say, strategically incomplete. I would also announce that we will not spend 5% of GDP on the military. Russia is not strong enough. Just that 2% we will now spend in Europe – and we recommend this – we spend entirely on the new technology industry. On completely new solutions that will also pull our economy forward. And I would open great trade negotiations with Beijing. Whether they end successfully is another matter. But great ones. On the scale of the Congress of Vienna. So that during these proceedings, the Chinese would influence the Russians to calm down a bit and make them understand that we will not be America’s doormat in Europe. And then, in my opinion, we can return to Europe’s greatness. Meanwhile, at a very rapid pace, the European economic system is heading towards being “run over” by the Chinese, and no alliance with America will help us with that, because then the Americans will “run over” us. So the strategy should be to try to lift this ourselves, rather than being semi-peripheries or peripheries of America or China. And here the Chinese have an interest, because they will not want us to be a dominion of the United States.

TGG: Strategist Jacek Bartosiak indeed proves that he thinks unconventionally and creatively – something European elites, in my opinion, lack. They are too accustomed to beaten paths, to certain patterns of action. I also believe that without restoring market dynamics – that is, without rolling back integration to those four freedoms of the internal market – Europe will not recover. Consolidation, meaning centralization, means manual control by Brussels over literally every market segment. Without decentralization and deregulation, Europe will not move forward. On the other hand, I agree that Europe, which is deeply increasing its dependence on China, must solve this problem systematically – that is, through, let’s call it, great negotiations with China. Only the problem here is that the Chinese probably won’t want to make concessions…

JB: The more we delay this, the less they will want to make concessions.

TGG: Nuclear weapons – a great idea. But again, the question is whether Europeans won’t quarrel over it. The French might not want the Germans to acquire nuclear weapons. The Germans might not want the Poles to have nuclear weapons, etc. Regardless, I agree with you and Albert Świdziński that Poland should start a nuclear program, or at least try in this way to force the Americans to participate in the nuclear sharing program. Thank you very much for the conversation.

1. The Kindleberger Trap is a theory in international relations, coined by political scientist Joseph Nye, drawing on the work of economist Charles Kindleberger. It describes a geopolitical danger arising from a situation in which the dominant global power withdraws from its role as the world’s leader, while the rising power is unable or unwilling to take over its responsibilities, leading to global chaos.