Two Wars, or the Fragility of “Pax Americana”
by Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse
Introduction
I would like to compare the current conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. A common feature of both is the weakening of the previously dominant global power holding hegemonic status, namely the United States. In both cases examined here, Washington’s attempt to resolve the conflict was perceived as disloyalty toward regional allies and, at the same time, as a selfish pursuit of American interests at the expense of regional stability and the security interests of America’s allies.
Both conflicts unfolded in a situation in which the United States was withdrawing from its previous level of engagement in the region. The United States sought to end these regional conflicts as quickly as possible, among other reasons because it wished to withdraw at least part of its forces and political activity from these regions and focus on geopolitical competition with China in the Indo-Pacific. In the case of Europe, Washington had already informed its allies of such intentions during the presidency of Joe Biden. In the Middle East, the United States partly sought to reduce its own involvement (after first stabilizing the situation in the region), while one of Iran’s objectives was to “push” the United States out of the region, especially by reducing the American military presence in the Middle East.
In both cases examined here, this resulted in the decline of “Pax Americana” (or at least a crisis of that order) and geopolitical destabilization. It generated intense competition among regional powers seeking the strongest possible geopolitical position within the new balance of power.
In both regions there was therefore a conflict among regional powers, while a revisionist power also came to the fore (the Russian Federation in Europe and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Middle East, respectively), seeking to bring an end to the old system of geopolitical stabilization based on “Pax Americana.” Finally, in both regions the regional conflicts took place in the shadow of the global rivalry between China and the United States and thus, to some extent, possessed the characteristics of a proxy war. They were therefore indirect conflicts between a weakening global status quo power seeking to preserve the existing world order and a revisionist global power dissatisfied with the current distribution of power and actively attempting to change, disrupt, or overthrow the prevailing international system.
In both case studies analyzed here, conflict resolution was extremely difficult for a number of reasons. First, the global power that had previously dominated the international system was weakened and interested in ending regional conflicts as quickly as possible while partially reducing its presence in both regions under analysis.
Second, in both regions stabilization was hindered by Sino-American rivalry and by Chinese efforts aimed at obstructing the realization of American objectives.
Third, in both regions deep structural factors, as well as strong conflicts of interest and powerful emotions, made the achievement of lasting peace difficult.
Moreover, in both regions conflict-resolution efforts—at least in the initial phase of the process—favored the stronger party and were based on fragile legal and institutional arrangements. Consequently, attempts to achieve peace are extraordinarily difficult, and geopolitical stabilization appears distant. Although a resolution of the conflict in Europe seemed increasingly likely in 2026, there is little reason to believe that such a settlement would prove durable.
Europe
The European Communities, and later the European Union, were products of American primacy after the Second World War. Above all, this was due to Washington’s support for the post-war reconstruction of the Old Continent and for its political and economic integration. Europe was able to integrate thanks to the American nuclear umbrella and the presence of U.S. troops on the continent, meaning that Washington stabilized the security situation.
Therefore, the withdrawal of the United States from Europe—in accordance with an offshore balancing strategy—constitutes a major blow to the stability of the European security system. In these circumstances, Western Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy represents an attempt to safeguard not only its own security but also political integration itself, which could collapse in the event of geopolitical destabilization.
However, efforts to preserve the European integration project may prove difficult.
The system of continental geopolitical stability had, since the seventeenth century, been based on three factors.
First, it was founded on the principles established by the Peace of Westphalia (1648), namely respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in internal political affairs, particularly ideological matters.
Second, the practical application of the Westphalian system in the seventeenth century, and later the stabilization of the European system following the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815), relied on a balance of power among the major states, sometimes referred to as the “concert of powers.”
Third, beginning in the eighteenth century, an important element of system stabilization was the dominance of an external hegemon within the continental system, first the United Kingdom and later the United States.
In the twenty-first century, all three of these principles of the European order have been seriously undermined.¹
Above all, the global primacy of the United States has been weakening, while that same power has partially withdrawn from European affairs. This alone was bound to destabilize the geopolitical system of the Old Continent.
As if that were not enough, Moscow’s attack on Ukraine disrupted the strategic balance in Europe. There is also no longer a balance of power within the European Union itself. Germany has become dominant and is no longer effectively balanced by France and its southern European allies.
Central Europe has become increasingly dependent on Germany, primarily in economic terms but, after 2023, increasingly in political terms as well. Furthermore, the monetary union introduced in Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century deepened disparities between Germany (and the countries of the “wealthy North,” including the Netherlands) and France together with its traditional allies in Southern Europe.
This increased Berlin’s power and further disturbed the balance of power within the European Union.
In addition, the European Union gradually moved away from Westphalian principles. These principles had not only been a condition for systemic stability on the Old Continent but had, over time, become the main values legitimizing international relations on a global scale.
The Union, however, rejected the Westphalian concept of respecting the sovereignty of member states and increasingly intervened in their internal political affairs. This created political tensions in Europe that made it more difficult for the EU to overcome crises, including the stabilization of the conflict in Ukraine.
The weakening of the West (the United States and te European Union) encouraged a regional revisionist power to rebuild its geopolitical position.
An additional destabilizing factor, as already mentioned, was the desire of the United States to partially withdraw from responsibility for the security of the Old Continent. This weakened “Pax Americana,” that is, the geopolitical stability in the region guaranteed by the United States since the end of the Second World War.
Russian elites possess imperial ambitions that they seek to pursue by taking advantage of Western weakness. This involved rebuilding geopolitical influence in Central and Eastern Europe, not only in Ukraine and Belarus but also within NATO’s so-called eastern flank, namely Central Europe and the Baltic states.
This has drawn the largest regional powers into the conflict, particularly Germany in the case of the European Union. Increasingly, both the EU and its individual member states—Germany above all—supported Ukraine in its conflict with Moscow, especially after the withdrawal of such assistance by the United States following the beginning of Donald Trump’s second presidency.
In particular, geopolitical rivalry between Russia and Germany for influence in Central and Eastern Europe has re-emerged.
As noted earlier, increasing instability in Europe serves China’s interests. Beijing is interested in further weakening the West and tying down the resources of the United States, NATO, and the European Union in regional conflicts.
For this reason, China supported Moscow by supplying raw materials and components necessary for weapons production. It also permitted the recruitment of Chinese nationals and allowed the presence of North Korean soldiers on the front lines.
China’s allies, such as Iran and North Korea, have long provided extensive support to Moscow’s war effort.
It appears that Beijing possesses significantly greater leverage than Washington over Russia’s behavior in this conflict and therefore greater ability to force its termination. China may choose to use this influence to calm the situation in Europe when it no longer needs to engage in systemic rivalry with the United States and its allies, or when Moscow’s gains in Europe cease to align with Chinese interests.
In this way, the regional conflict in Europe possesses the characteristics of a proxy war, and its resolution is difficult without Chinese participation or without a broader settlement of the global rivalry between Beijing and Washington.
The resolution of the conflict in Europe is difficult for many reasons.
The geopolitical position of the United States is weakening both globally and regionally, making it difficult to impose a rapid end to the war on the regional powers involved.
Moreover, in seeking to stabilize the situation in the region as quickly as possible, the United States accepted conditions put forward by Moscow, the stronger party in the regional conflict, at least until 2026.
Furthermore, Washington’s objective was to improve relations with Moscow and even to break the close relationship between Russia and China.
All of this created a preference for conditions dictated by the Kremlin during peace negotiations.
This approach was perceived by Ukraine and America’s European allies as selfish behavior on the part of the United States and as a deterioration of the security of Kyiv and NATO’s eastern flank at the expense of the interests of American allies.
It clearly weakened confidence in the reliability of the United States as an ally.
As a result, severe tensions emerged within transatlantic relations, and Ukraine together with several EU member states directly blocked the possibility of an American-Russian agreement that failed to adequately consider allied interests.
Both Kyiv and EU member states increasingly began to build their own military and defense-industrial capabilities in order to reduce military dependence on the United States.
They also sought greater “strategic autonomy” vis-à-vis Washington.
At the same time, the conflict continued, and because of existing structural contradictions and conflicting interests, its resolution remained difficult.
The halting of the Russian offensive by Ukrainian forces in 2026 created conditions for breaking the deadlock in peace negotiations and freezing the conflict, at least temporarily.
Additionally, the Ukrainian armed forces effectively disrupted Russian logistics operations, including the delivery of weapons and supplies to the front lines.
Of no small significance was the United States’ decision to cut Russia off from Starlink services. This demonstrates that Washington still retains substantial influence over both sides in the conflict.
Furthermore, Ukraine weakened Moscow’s petrochemical capabilities and therefore its ability to finance the war through energy exports.
Middle East
The weakening of the United States on a global scale and its intention to partially withdraw from the Middle East were developments that the region’s major powers, Israel and Iran, sought to exploit.
Both sought to strengthen their geopolitical position in the region, while their ambitions were viewed unfavorably by the third influential regional state, Turkey.
In reality, however, there were two states competing for regional dominance: Israel and Iran.
The title of revisionist power belongs most clearly to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The monetary union increased Berlin’s power and disrupted the balance of power within the European Union.
In addition, the European Union gradually moved away from the principles of the Westphalian order. These principles had long constituted not only a condition for systemic stability on the Old Continent but, over time, had also become the main values legitimizing international relations on a global scale. The EU, however, rejected the Westphalian concept of respect for the sovereignty of member states and increasingly intervened in their domestic political affairs. This created political tensions within Europe, making it more difficult for the Union to overcome crises, including the stabilization of the conflict in Ukraine.
The weakening of the West (the United States and the European Union) encouraged a regional revisionist power to rebuild its own geopolitical position. An additional destabilizing factor, as already noted, was the American desire to partially withdraw from responsibility for the security of the Old Continent. This undermined “Pax Americana,” the geopolitical stabilization of the region that had been guaranteed by the United States since the end of the Second World War.
Russian elites possess imperial ambitions that they seek to pursue by taking advantage of Western weakness. These ambitions involve the restoration of geopolitical influence in Central and Eastern Europe—not only in Ukraine and Belarus, but also across NATO’s eastern flank, including Central Europe and the Baltic states.
This situation has drawn the largest regional powers into the conflict, particularly Germany within the European Union. Both the EU and its individual member states—most notably Germany—have increasingly supported Ukraine in its conflict with Moscow, especially after the United States reduced such assistance during Donald Trump’s second presidency. In particular, geopolitical rivalry between Russia and Germany over influence in Central and Eastern Europe re-emerged.
As noted earlier, the deepening destabilization of Europe serves China’s interests. Beijing benefits from the continued weakening of the West and from the engagement of American, NATO, and EU resources in regional conflicts. For this reason, China has supported Moscow by providing raw materials and components necessary for the production of military equipment. It has also tolerated the recruitment of Chinese nationals and the presence of North Korean troops on the battlefield. China’s allies, such as Iran and North Korea, have long provided significant support for Moscow’s war effort.
It appears that Beijing possesses considerably greater leverage over Russia in this conflict than does Washington and therefore has a greater capacity to influence its conduct or compel an end to the war. China may choose to use this influence to calm the situation in Europe when it no longer finds itself engaged in systemic rivalry with the United States and its allies, or when Russian gains in Europe cease to align with Chinese interests.
In this sense, the European conflict possesses the characteristics of a proxy war, and its resolution is difficult without Chinese participation or without a broader settlement of the global rivalry between Beijing and Washington.
Resolving the conflict in Europe is difficult for many reasons. The geopolitical position of the United States has weakened both globally and regionally, making it harder to impose a rapid end to the war on the regional powers involved. Furthermore, in seeking to stabilize the region as quickly as possible, Washington was prepared to accept conditions proposed by Moscow, which remained the stronger party in the regional conflict, at least until 2026.
Another objective of the United States was rapprochement with Moscow and even the weakening of the close relationship between Russia and China. All of this contributed to a preference for conditions dictated by the Kremlin during peace negotiations.
This approach was perceived by Ukraine and America’s European allies as an expression of American self-interest, one that diminished the security of Kyiv and NATO’s eastern flank at the expense of allied interests. It significantly weakened confidence in the reliability of the United States as an ally.
As a consequence, major tensions emerged in transatlantic relations, and Ukraine together with several EU member states directly blocked the possibility of an American-Russian agreement that failed to take allied interests properly into account.
Both Kyiv and EU member states increasingly sought to strengthen their own military and defense-industrial capabilities in order to reduce dependence on the United States. They also pursued greater strategic autonomy vis-à-vis Washington.
At the same time, the conflict continued, and given the existing structural contradictions and divergence of interests, a resolution remained difficult. The halting of the Russian offensive by Ukrainian forces in 2026 created conditions for breaking the deadlock in peace negotiations and freezing the conflict, at least temporarily.
Moreover, Ukrainian armed forces effectively disrupted Russian logistics, including the delivery of weapons and supplies to the front lines. The interruption of Russian access to Starlink services by the United States was also significant. This demonstrated that Washington still retained substantial influence over both sides of the conflict.
In addition, Ukraine weakened Moscow’s petrochemical capabilities, thereby reducing Russia’s ability to finance the war through exports of energy resources.
The weakening of the United States on a global scale, together with its intention to partially disengage from the Middle East, was exploited by the region’s principal powers—Israel and Iran. Both sought to strengthen their geopolitical positions in the region, and their ambitions were viewed unfavorably by another influential regional state, Turkey.
In practice, however, the principal competitors for regional dominance were Israel and Iran. Among them, the Islamic Republic of Iran most clearly deserves the designation of a revisionist power.
The objective of Iran is to dominate the Middle East through…
The objective of Iran is to dominate the Middle East through a network of allied organizations and states commonly referred to as the “Axis of Resistance.” This includes, among others, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, various Shiite militias operating in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthi movement in Yemen.
Iran has consistently sought to challenge the regional order established under American dominance. It has attempted to limit American influence, undermine the position of U.S. allies, and create a geopolitical environment favorable to Tehran’s interests.
The principal obstacle to these ambitions has been Israel, which possesses military superiority, advanced technological capabilities, close ties with the United States, and a significant deterrent potential, including nuclear capabilities.
The attack carried out by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023 initiated a chain of events that dramatically transformed the strategic situation in the Middle East. Israel responded with a large-scale military campaign aimed at destroying Hamas’s military infrastructure and weakening the broader network of Iranian influence in the region.
The conflict gradually expanded beyond the Gaza Strip. It increasingly involved Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Iraq, as well as the Houthis in Yemen, who sought to disrupt maritime traffic in the Red Sea and thereby exert pressure on Israel and its Western allies.
As the conflict widened, Israel increasingly targeted the regional infrastructure of Iranian influence. The objective was not only to weaken individual organizations but also to reduce Tehran’s ability to project power throughout the Middle East.
This strategy produced substantial results. Hezbollah suffered serious military and political losses. Hamas’s operational capabilities were significantly degraded. Iranian influence in Syria weakened as a result of both Israeli operations and changing regional dynamics.
These developments altered the regional balance of power in Israel’s favor. Nevertheless, they did not eliminate the underlying causes of instability. Iran retained significant resources, extensive networks of influence, and the ability to destabilize the region indirectly.
At the same time, the United States attempted to prevent a broader regional war. Washington sought to support Israel while simultaneously avoiding direct military confrontation with Iran. The American administration feared that escalation could draw the United States into another large-scale conflict in the Middle East, thereby diverting resources and attention from strategic competition with China.
This approach was perceived differently by various actors in the region. Some regarded it as a prudent effort to maintain stability, while others interpreted it as evidence of declining American determination and a reduced willingness to defend the existing regional order.
Iran, in particular, interpreted American restraint as confirmation that Washington wished to avoid escalation at almost any cost. This perception encouraged Tehran to continue testing the limits of American and Israeli responses.
Meanwhile, Israel increasingly concluded that it could not rely exclusively on external guarantees for its security. As a result, Israeli decision-makers became more inclined to undertake unilateral military actions designed to eliminate threats before they reached a critical level.
The issue of Iran’s nuclear program remained central to these calculations. Israeli leaders repeatedly emphasized that they would not permit Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. From their perspective, such a development would fundamentally alter the regional balance of power and pose an existential threat to the Jewish state.
For Tehran, however, the nuclear program represented not only a security instrument but also a symbol of national prestige and strategic autonomy. Consequently, compromise remained difficult.
The rivalry between Israel and Iran therefore extended far beyond individual military confrontations. It reflected a broader struggle over the future political and strategic order of the Middle East.
At the same time, other regional powers sought to take advantage of the changing balance of power. Turkey pursued a more active foreign policy, attempting to expand its influence in neighboring regions and position itself as an indispensable actor in regional affairs.
Saudi Arabia likewise sought to strengthen its position. While remaining concerned about Iranian ambitions, Riyadh increasingly pursued a pragmatic strategy aimed at reducing tensions and preserving regional stability.
These overlapping rivalries contributed to a highly complex geopolitical environment. No single actor possessed sufficient power to impose a stable regional order, while the declining willingness of the United States to act as an unquestioned guarantor of security further increased uncertainty.
As in Europe, the weakening of “Pax Americana” encouraged regional powers to pursue more ambitious and independent policies. This intensified competition and made lasting stabilization considerably more difficult.
An additional factor destabilizing the region was the growing involvement of external powers. Just as in Europe, the conflict in the Middle East unfolded in the broader context of global rivalry between the United States and China.
Beijing sought to expand its influence throughout the region primarily through economic instruments. China became a major trading partner for many Middle Eastern countries and a significant purchaser of energy resources. This increased its political leverage and allowed it to present itself as an alternative partner to the United States.
Unlike Washington, Beijing generally avoided direct military involvement in regional disputes. Instead, it emphasized economic cooperation, infrastructure investment, and diplomatic engagement. This approach was attractive to many regional governments because it did not require political alignment with Chinese values or institutions.
At the same time, China benefited from any weakening of American influence in the region. The erosion of U.S. authority reduced the cohesion of the Western alliance system and increased opportunities for Beijing to expand its geopolitical presence.
For this reason, China had little incentive to support initiatives that would strengthen long-term American leadership in the Middle East. Although Beijing publicly advocated peace and stability, it also benefited strategically from a situation in which Washington was compelled to devote resources and attention to multiple regional crises.
The Middle East therefore became another arena in which the broader competition between the United States and China was indirectly expressed. As in Europe, regional actors pursued their own objectives while simultaneously interacting with the strategic calculations of global powers.
This created a multilayered conflict environment. Local disputes, regional rivalries, and global competition became intertwined, making conflict resolution increasingly difficult.
The position of the United States was particularly complicated. Washington wished to maintain regional stability while simultaneously reducing the costs associated with direct involvement. These goals were often contradictory.
On the one hand, American withdrawal encouraged regional actors to assume greater responsibility for their own security. On the other hand, the resulting power vacuum increased the likelihood of conflict and instability.
This dilemma became increasingly evident during successive crises. Every attempt to reduce American engagement risked encouraging revisionist actors. Yet maintaining a large-scale presence imposed substantial political, military, and economic costs.
Israel viewed these developments with growing concern. Israeli leaders feared that any perception of declining American commitment would encourage Iran and its allies to adopt more aggressive policies.
Consequently, Israel increasingly emphasized self-reliance and military preparedness. It sought to preserve qualitative military superiority and maintain the capability to act independently when necessary.
Iran drew different conclusions from the same developments. Tehran interpreted the weakening of American influence as evidence that the regional balance was shifting in its favor. This encouraged efforts to consolidate existing gains and expand influence where opportunities emerged.
Nevertheless, Iranian ambitions also faced important constraints. Economic difficulties, domestic political tensions, international sanctions, and military pressure limited Tehran’s ability to achieve all of its objectives.
The regional environment therefore remained highly fluid. No actor was capable of establishing uncontested dominance, yet several possessed sufficient capabilities to obstruct the ambitions of others.
Under such circumstances, the prospect of a stable and durable peace remained limited. Temporary ceasefires, tactical agreements, and localized arrangements were possible, but a comprehensive settlement addressing the fundamental causes of conflict appeared much more difficult to achieve.
As in Europe, peace initiatives often reflected the interests of the strongest actors rather than a broadly accepted and sustainable regional consensus. This reduced their legitimacy and increased the likelihood that conflicts would re-emerge in the future.
The weakening of American hegemony thus did not automatically produce a new stable order. Instead, it created a transitional period characterized by uncertainty, rivalry, and competition among regional and global powers.
In this respect, the Middle East and Europe displayed striking similarities. In both regions, the erosion of “Pax Americana” encouraged geopolitical competition, empowered revisionist actors, and complicated efforts to establish a durable peace.
The resulting instability may therefore be interpreted not merely as a regional phenomenon but as a manifestation of broader transformations occurring within the international system as a whole.
Conclusion
The conflicts in Europe and the Middle East demonstrate the fragility of the international order that emerged under American leadership after the Second World War.
In both regions, the weakening of the United States and its reduced willingness to bear the costs of regional stabilization encouraged geopolitical competition among local powers. At the same time, revisionist actors sought to exploit these changes in order to improve their strategic positions.
The crisis of “Pax Americana” did not immediately lead to the creation of a new international order. Instead, it produced a period of uncertainty during which existing institutions and balances of power became increasingly contested.
Both conflicts reveal the limitations of contemporary conflict-resolution mechanisms. Peace initiatives are difficult to implement when major powers possess divergent interests and when regional actors perceive compromise as threatening their long-term security.
Furthermore, global competition between the United States and China has become an additional obstacle to stabilization. Regional conflicts are increasingly linked to broader strategic rivalries, making them more difficult to resolve and more resistant to external mediation.
The cases of Europe and the Middle East suggest that the contemporary international system is entering a transitional phase. The previous order is weakening, but a new stable equilibrium has not yet emerged.
As a result, regional conflicts are likely to remain a central feature of international politics. Their outcomes will significantly influence the future distribution of power at both the regional and global levels.
The ultimate question is therefore not only how individual wars will end, but also what type of international order will emerge from the gradual erosion of American predominance.
Whether this transition leads to a more stable multipolar system or to prolonged geopolitical instability remains one of the most important unanswered questions of contemporary international relations.
¹ G. J. Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000
2 National Defense Strategy 2026, January 2026, Washington, https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF [27.01.2026], 20.
3Netanyahu: Israel will stand on its own, not rely on US funding, Israel National News, Nov 13, 2025, https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/417749 [27.05.2026].
4 Congress advances US-Israeli military integration plan, Al Jazeera, 30 May 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/30/us-congress-advances-american-israeli-military-integration-plan [30.05.2026].
