What Follows from the U.S. National Security Strategy? by Prof. Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse
A Bit of Theory
Classical geopolitical thought is gaining importance. It is therefore worth recalling Halford Mackinder (1861–1947) and his concept of the Heartland, that is, Eurasia. The British scholar believed that dominance over this area ensured power over the entire world and consequently, global hegemony. At the same time, he pointed to the need to contain continental (that is, land-based) powers striving for such dominance. In Mackinder’s time, this applied primarily to Germany and later to Russia (then the Soviet Union).
The way to achieve balance was therefore to limit the imperial ambitions of these two powers. Mackinder proposed, among other things, building a strong buffer between Russia and Germany in Central and Eastern Europe. The concept of the Intermarium thus emerged as a response to German imperialism (the cause of World War I and World War II) and Moscow’s imperialism (the cause of the Cold War and later the aggression of the Russian Federation against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014).
Another way of protecting against imperialism by these two powers is fragmentation—that is, dividing both states. In the case of Germany, this was implemented after World War II—into a western part (the Federal Republic of Germany) and an eastern part (the German Democratic Republic). In turn, the fragmentation of the Soviet Union occurred after 1990. Independent states emerged, such as Ukraine and the Baltic states, and Central Europe also regained independence.
In other words, the way to establish geopolitical stabilization in Eurasia is to combine fragmentation with integration, which we may call “limited fragmentation.” States striving for hegemony should be divided, while at the same time integrated buffers between them should be created, such as the Intermarium. In this way, a balance of power in Eurasia is achieved, and thus geopolitical stabilization.
Another important geopolitical concept was developed by Nicholas Spykman (1893–1943). It argues that it is not the Heartland but the so-called Rimland that has key geopolitical significance. Spykman’s thinking concerned the areas on the periphery of Eurasia and the seas and oceans surrounding them. Control over the Rimland provides a systemic encirclement of the Heartland and thus makes it more difficult for any power that would dominate Eurasia to pursue global expansion.
Therefore, it is not necessary to fragment or reintegrate Eurasia; it is sufficient to control the Rimland in order to achieve geopolitical stabilization on a global scale. Of fundamental importance in Spykman’s concept was control over communication, trade, and military routes—namely the seas and oceans surrounding Eurasia. Military bases enabling control of these waters, located on the edges of the Rimland, were also important. Equally significant was the consolidation of Western Europe as a bastion against the expansion of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, as well as American influence in the Middle East, India, the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, and Australia, which ensured easier control over the southern waters of Eurasia.
Finally, let us recall the Monroe Doctrine, introduced by the United States more than two centuries ago and once again relevant in a situation of destabilization of the international order. It refers to the idea of exclusive spheres of influence of great powers and is therefore thoroughly geopolitical. In 1823, the President of the United States, James Monroe, proclaimed an American sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, to which other powers—at that time European—would not have access. Today, this primarily concerns the removal by the United States of Chinese and Russian influence from Latin America.
The Monroe Doctrine
The nineteenth-century Monroe Doctrine was explicitly referenced in the U.S. National Security Strategy announced in November 2025.
“After years of neglect, the United States will once again reaffirm and enforce the Monroe Doctrine in order to restore American dominance in the Western Hemisphere and protect our territory and access to key geographically important areas of the region. We will not allow powers from outside the hemisphere to deploy armed forces or other threatening capabilities there or to acquire ownership or control over strategically significant assets. (…) The United States must be the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere—this is a condition of our security and prosperity and the foundation of our ability to act assertively wherever necessary. The terms of our alliances and assistance will depend on the withdrawal of hostile powers’ influence—from control over military installations, ports, and key infrastructure to the acquisition of broadly understood strategic assets.”
The kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro at the beginning of January 2026 by U.S. special forces fits well with the above-cited words of the National Strategy. In this way, Washington is in practice pushing Chinese and Russian geo-economic influence out of the region. At the same time, it intends to install American corporations in Venezuela and thereby take control over its rich oil deposits. The exploitation of these deposits could bring benefits not only to the U.S. economy. By reducing global oil prices, it would be advantageous for Washington’s geopolitical interests, for example, by weakening Moscow’s ability to finance the war in Ukraine. Representatives of the Trump administration also announced that next they would deal with removing foreign influence in Cuba, in Colombia, and even in Mexico.
Restoring the Monroe Doctrine in Washington’s policy, however, may not be easy. Many Latin American states reacted very negatively to Washington’s actions toward Venezuela, which in an obvious manner violated international law and the sovereignty of that state. As a consequence, the already strong anti-American sentiment in the region intensified further, and in particular hostility toward Donald Trump.
Perhaps one of the few exceptions here is Argentina, governed by the ideologically close to Trump President Javier Milei. Nevertheless, even states that had previously been relatively close to the United States, such as Mexico and Canada, which in the past had been linked to the U.S. by a free trade agreement (NAFTA), later renamed USMCA (United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement), were seriously concerned about Trump’s actions in Latin America. This concerned not only the assessment of actions toward Venezuela but also the aggressive U.S. tariff policy, which undermined earlier good trade relations. In addition, repeated proposals by Trump to incorporate Canada into the United States aroused strong resentment among Canadians. Taken together, these developments indicate that the Republican administration under Trump, on the one hand, aggressively moved to implement the Monroe Doctrine and increased benefits for the American economy. On the other hand, it strained regional alliances and neglected the legitimization of American leadership in the Western Hemisphere.
Rimland
In Spykman’s concept, the most important issue is maintaining U.S. control over the main maritime communication arteries surrounding Eurasia. Of fundamental importance are the southern waters. They are still to a large extent controlled by Washington; nevertheless, China is consistently building a potential that would allow it to break this advantage and push the American fleet out of the most strategic seas surrounding the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Beijing is increasingly becoming a maritime power rather than merely a land-based one, as evidenced by its rapidly developing naval forces, an ever-growing number of naval bases along the entire route around the Rimland, as well as artificial islands built in the Paracel Islands archipelago and the Spratly Islands. This is of great importance for pushing the United States beyond the so-called first island chain. The takeover of Taiwan by the PRC, which may occur either peacefully or as a result of military conquest, would not only definitively consolidate Beijing’s influence over the seas surrounding China, thus pushing the U.S. fleet beyond the first island chain, but would also open the way for China to the Pacific Ocean. This would be in line with the expectations of one Chinese admiral, who stated that Americans should be pushed back as far as the line of Hawaii.
This development would, of course, deprive the United States of the ability to control the waters surrounding Eurasia and would also threaten American allies such as the Philippines, Japan, and Australia, as well as “neutral” India. China is also expanding land-based communication routes, namely the “Belt and Road” initiative, which is intended to make the country independent of southern maritime routes, as well as to increasingly encircle India geopolitically. Moreover, Beijing is intensively preparing to open a new northern communication route through the Arctic Ocean.
From this point of view, Greenland is so important for the Americans. It constitutes the terminus of the transport route through the Arctic Ocean, which is gaining ever greater military and commercial significance. At the same time, it has strategic importance for securing communication across the Atlantic Ocean, that is, between the United States and Europe. In addition, it possesses important resources, including rare earth metals, which facilitates breaking the Chinese monopoly over these raw materials. All of this explains Donald Trump’s interest in taking control over the island, which is currently an autonomous territory of Denmark.
An important dimension of the Sino-American confrontation is geo-economics. As emphasized in the National Security Strategy, “what began as a relationship between a mature, wealthy economy and one of the poorest countries in the world has transformed into a relationship between nearly equal players.” Responsibility for this lies with successive American administrations, which became “eager co-authors of the Chinese strategy” and allowed the Chinese to exploit the system of American globalization unilaterally to their own benefit, while doing so at the expense of U.S. geo-economic interests. “China became rich and powerful and used its wealth and power to great advantage.”
The strategy describes the ineffectiveness of previous American policy, including sanctions. “China adapted to the change in U.S. tariff policy initiated in 2017, among other things by strengthening its control over supply chains, particularly in low- and middle-income countries—belonging to the most important future fields of economic rivalry. Chinese exports to low-income countries doubled between 2020 and 2024. The United States imports Chinese goods indirectly—through intermediaries and Chinese factories located in a dozen countries, including Mexico. Currently, China’s exports to low-income countries are almost four times greater than its exports to the United States. When President Trump took office in 2017, China’s exports to the U.S. amounted to 4 percent of its GDP; today this figure has fallen to just over 2 percent. Despite this, China still sells goods to the American market through other intermediary states.”
In other words, the tariff policy pursued by Trump, Joe Biden, and again Trump has proven ineffective. It appears to cause more damage to Americans themselves and to their alliance relations than to the Middle Kingdom. It also failed to cut China off from American capital, more broadly from financial markets, or from the most advanced technologies. The PRC possesses an increasingly advanced domestic technological base, which it successfully uses for modern industries as well as for its armed forces. In the production of the most advanced semiconductors, it lags behind the West by at most a few years and is rapidly closing the gap.
Moreover, China has mastered many key production chains and possesses an industrial potential several times greater than that of the United States. This is of decisive importance in the event of military confrontation. Beijing even has an advantage over the United States in a trade war, as it holds a near monopoly over strategic raw materials such as rare earth metals. This allows it to seriously slow down the capabilities of modern production sectors in the West (not only in the United States), as well as in the defense industry. In addition, the Middle Kingdom can relatively easily cut off the U.S. pharmaceutical industry from key inputs. The Chinese can also make life difficult for American farmers, for example, by limiting imports of soybeans produced by them. This could strike at the political interests of the Republican administration.
Summing up, Washington is losing the economic war with China, and its probable escalation in 2026 will inevitably affect the interests of American companies and consumers more than the economy of the PRC. China has for many years successfully implemented a strategy of maximum independence from the West (especially from the United States), while at the same time increasing the dependence of Western economies on Beijing.
With each passing day, the United States is losing its ability to effectively defend Taiwan and may also be cut off from the seas surrounding China (especially the South China Sea). This would mean pushing the U.S. further into the Pacific, perhaps even beyond the so-called second island chain, which would directly threaten the Philippines, Japan, and Australia. The Americans will sooner or later face a strategic decision: whether to militarily defend their position in the waters around Eurasia, or to withdraw, or possibly to conclude some kind of agreement with the Chinese on the division of spheres of influence.
Therefore, increasingly determined efforts by Washington to gain control over Greenland and the northern maritime route will be obvious. The United States will also seek to overthrow the regime of the ayatollahs in Iran and strengthen its own position in the Middle East.
The withdrawal of the United States or its being pushed out of operations in the southern seas around China would mean a serious danger for Washington’s Asian allies. In such a case, they would have to make a decision either to recognize the regional hegemony of the Middle Kingdom or to increase allied consolidation. The latter scenario would open the way to geo-economic or even military confrontation, although a potential attempt to build a stable counterbalance to Beijing in this part of the Rimland is also possible (based on a coalition of India, South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, and the United States).
China’s dominance in the region, and thus its increasingly strong position in Eurasia, must lead to conflict with Moscow. This is virtually inevitable in a situation in which Russia would attempt to expand westward, that is, to begin the conquest of Central Europe. In such a scenario, further fragmentation—that is, the breakup of Russia—would occur. It would be highly probable that Belarus’s dependence on Moscow would end, as well as that Turkey would attempt to push Russia away from the Black Sea and gain a dominant position in the Caucasus. A Sino-Russian war would also provide an opportunity for Washington to restore full control over the southern waters around Eurasia.
What’s Next for Europe?
Western Europe was an important part of the Rimland during the Cold War, as evidenced by the strong military presence of the United States in this region. The Old Continent also plays a huge role in Mackinder’s strategic thinking. Much attention is devoted to this part of the world in the National Security Strategy. The goal of this strategy is to “promote European greatness.” Americans lament the declining economic and geopolitical potential of the European Union. They recognize that the problem is not only its weakening economic competitiveness but also its decreasing defense capabilities, which make it difficult for Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own security.
“This economic decline pales, however, in comparison with the real and much more serious prospect of civilizational erasure. The greater problems facing Europe include the actions of the European Union and other supranational institutions that undermine political freedom and sovereignty, migration policies transforming the continent and generating tensions, censorship of freedom of speech and suppression of political opposition, dramatic declines in fertility rates, and the loss of national identities and a sense of self-worth. If current trends continue, the continent will be unrecognizable within 20 years or sooner. As a result, it is far from obvious whether some European states will possess economies and armed forces strong enough to remain credible allies.”
American criticism concerns both misguided EU policies—above all migration and climate policy—as well as improper institutional tendencies, namely centralization (federalization), which limit democracy and national sovereignty, reduce the ability to cultivate patriotism, and weaken social mobilization for security.
Trump’s previous policy disregarded alliances and the narrative legitimizing his actions on the international stage. Disapproval of internal European affairs was received very negatively in Western Europe, especially in Brussels, Berlin, and Paris. Western Europe reacted negatively to all ideological criticism coming from the Trump administration. In addition, there are a number of transatlantic economic conflicts, the dispute over Greenland, disagreements over Trump’s approach to the war in Ukraine and the manner of the American withdrawal from responsibility for European security, and finally, disputes over U.S. compliance with international law. These conflicts may only deepen in 2026. Moreover, more than 70 percent of Western Europeans hold a negative opinion of Donald Trump. Nevertheless, the National Strategy declared that “we want to cooperate with states that share our goals and wish to restore their former greatness.”
This declaration was interpreted by liberal and left-wing circles in the EU as an announcement of dividing Europeans and undermining European unity by relying on conservative and nationalist forces. All the more so because the strategy explicitly stated that the U.S. objective would be “supporting resistance to Europe’s current course within individual European states.” At this point, the already mentioned problem of Trump’s underestimation of alliance ties emerges again, resulting in numerous transatlantic tensions as well as neglect of the need to shape a narrative legitimizing American policy in the eyes of international public opinion. Can deepened ideological ties with conservative groups in Europe provide a foundation for rebuilding alliance relations? Can Trump’s support for movements such as Alternative for Germany or the National Rally in France build such legitimacy? I am afraid not. The chances for decentralizing governance in the EU remain small. Meanwhile, Trump’s policy supporting the “Make Europe Great Again” movement may destabilize Europe and thus make it even weaker.
The Trump administration is right when it points out that excessive centralization in the EU may paradoxically weaken rather than strengthen European security. After all, NATO does not develop a strong supranational structure but relies on cooperation among sovereign states. Centralization in Europe may lead to the weakening of state structures and thus national defense systems, just as mass immigration undermines the potential for social mobilization in self-defense. However, in the case of NATO, there is a strong leader—the United States—which possesses real capacity to provide support to smaller states. In the event of an American withdrawal from Europe, this task would have to be taken over by Germany or France, which may encounter a number of practical problems. These range from disputes between Paris and Berlin, through reluctance to excessively finance defense on the eastern flank, to the still insufficient military potential of these capitals to deter Moscow, and finally to a lack of trust by some states in German leadership in the field of security.
This leads us to the German challenge in Europe. As is well known, it had fundamental significance in Mackinder’s concept and was shaped by the experiences of the First and Second World Wars. The solution to this problem was fragmentation (that is, the division of Germany), the presence of American troops in Western Europe (especially in the Federal Republic of Germany), and extensive institutionalization in this region (the European Communities, NATO). Today, the Trump administration seeks to weaken this institutionalization and, in fact, increases the fragility of both the EU and NATO. Washington also plans a gradual withdrawal of its troops from the Old Continent. As if that were not enough, after the end of the Cold War, Germany was reunified. Nor did a separate political integration of the Intermarium take place outside the structures of the EU. The inclusion of Central European states into the EU effectively turned this region into a sphere of influence of Berlin, dominated economically and politically by the Federal Republic of Germany. As a consequence, this further strengthened a reunified Germany. The National Security Strategy does not recognize this challenge and merely points to Berlin’s strategic mistakes, such as excessive geo-economic dependence on China and Russia.
Summing up, it must be stated that the U.S. National Security Strategy diagnoses the weaknesses of the European Union quite accurately. Nevertheless, it is difficult to assume that the policy of this power, as designed in this document, could contribute to strengthening integration in Europe, increasing its security, or protecting it from Russian and German challenges.
Summary
Eurasia can be balanced “from the outside,” that is, through control of the Rimland and the maritime lines of communication around Eurasia, or “from the inside,” through “limited fragmentation,” that is, by combining integrative processes with disintegrative ones.
The geopolitical potential of Moscow is weakening as a result of the war in Ukraine, as evidenced by the loss of influence, among others, in Syria and Venezuela, as well as by its growing dependence on Beijing. Nevertheless, Moscow’s potential remains sufficiently strong to threaten Central Europe and the Baltic states. The solution to the problem of Moscow’s imperialism would be to combine a strategy of containment “from the outside,” above all through control of the northern lines of communication, with a strategy aimed at bringing about further fragmentation of Russia. In addition, the institutional integration of Central and Eastern Europe should be strengthened, both as an element of dividing Russia and at the same time creating an Intermarium buffer constituting a barrier to Moscow’s westward expansion.
The potential of a reunified Germany is too weak to deter Russia but strong enough to dominate Central Europe and perhaps even the entire European Union. The best way to restrain it would be to reduce the economic and political dependence of Central and Eastern Europe on Berlin, that is, to integrate this region (the Intermarium), preferably outside the structures of the EU.
The European Union is weakening economically and geopolitically, and the actions of the Trump administration will most likely not reverse these trends but rather intensify them. An additional factor of disintegration will be pressure exerted on this organization by Moscow. The involvement of EU states in a war with Russia would be another powerful blow to the Union. The EU may therefore not survive the period of destabilization of the regional and global international order. After its conclusion, regional integration processes should be rebuilt, preferably in two separate blocs: the Intermarium (including Ukraine and Belarus) and Western Europe.
The United States will probably not be able to maintain full control over the southern maritime lines of communication around Eurasia and may also fail to prevent the takeover of Taiwan by the PRC. This will disrupt the strategic balance in this region and may lead to the consolidation of a coalition balancing the position of the Middle Kingdom, composed, for example, of Japan, Australia, India, and the United States. This may lead to military confrontation between the two sides, the outcome of which would most likely either be the restoration of a balance of power or, conversely, the consolidation of Chinese dominance in the eastern part of Eurasia.
The alliance between Beijing and Moscow is unstable, especially in a situation in which China achieves regional hegemony or as a result of increased Russian imperial expansion westward. A Sino-Russian conflict would be an important factor in the fragmentation of the Russian Federation, although it could also disrupt the balance of power in Asia. It would therefore be an opportunity to attempt to rebuild U.S. influence in this region, which would open yet another area of confrontation in Eurasia.
