Łukasz Wojdyga: The U.S. Withdrawal from Europe Was Predictable by Sebastiano Giorgi
Łukasz Wojdyga, Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at the Warsaw Enterprise Institute summarizes the complex geopolitical situation, in light of the struggle for power between the United States, Europe, Russia, and China.
Beyond the desire for peace to be achieved as quickly as possible, what have we learned from this terrible war between Russia and Ukraine?
It is easy to say “peace,” but in reality, today, no one knows how or when the war will end. It is clear that President Trump is very keen to end it as soon as possible. But, he has hit a wall. Perhaps, he thought that putting pressure on Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, would be enough. But, we are dealing here with a complex mix of conditions. I will be honest; the war will not end quickly. Russia is interested in ending it only on its own terms, and unfortunately, time is working against Ukraine.
How likely is Ukraine joining the European Union and NATO?
Ukraine is absolutely striving for this. The NATO issue is the reason the war is ongoing; the Americans agreed to the Russian condition that the peace plan explicitly state that Ukraine will never join NATO. Meanwhile, some European countries insist that Ukraine’s path to the Alliance should not be closed.
There are, however, real chances that once the conflict ends, Ukraine will join the European Union. This comes with a challenge, as Ukraine would like to retain its current economic support rules—namely, exporting its products to the European market without meeting the requirements imposed by European regulations.
Ukraine’s accession to the EU would be beneficial for Poland only if Ukraine is subject to the same requirements as European producers, particularly in agriculture. If the rules of the game are the same for all participants, this would mean opening up a huge market for Poland. Many Polish companies are already present in Ukraine and stayed there even after the outbreak of the war, while many Western companies withdrew.
At the same time, the number of Ukrainian companies and workers in Poland is increasing.
Of course, this benefits the Polish economy—both in terms of GDP growth through economic and tax activity and demographically, as an influx of skilled and willing workers. At the same time, it also means an outflow of workers and potential soldiers from Ukraine, where their absence is particularly painful.
Has the war changed perceptions of Russia’s strength?
Paradoxically, despite Russian propaganda, the war has shown Russia’s weakness. The situation at the front is dynamic; Ukrainians may be withdrawing from certain areas, but overall they are defending themselves bravely, and at this pace it would take Russians several decades to capture Kyiv. Ukraine, especially at the beginning, relied solely on its own defensive forces. Had it not had the capacity to defend itself during those first weeks, the war would have ended immediately. This is crucial information for countries in our region: Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania. It is an important lesson for the future. No one will defend us, no one will fight for us—at least not in the first months. In the event of an attack on a NATO country, concrete military assistance from allies will not arrive overnight. First, a country must show it can defend itself so that certain procedures are even triggered. Politicians and experts often cite Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that in the event of an attack on a NATO country, other parties will take action deemed necessary to restore and maintain security. However, it does not explicitly state that all allies must immediately attack the aggressor.
I also remind you that before Article 5 there is Article 3, which states that states should maintain and develop individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. For us Poles, bordering Russia, this means above all that we must strengthen our army.
Poland is a pro-American country, with genuine fascination for the United States. But in light of Trump’s recent positions suggesting a certain withdrawal from shaping Europe’s future, is there no disappointment in Poland—a country that until recently even wanted to build the so-called Fort Trump?
Yes, Poland is definitely one of the most pro-American countries in Europe, perhaps even in the world. It is true that we have always counted on the United States; this tradition dates back to President Reagan’s era and U.S. support for the anti-communist opposition in Poland.
In today’s rapidly changing world, it is worth asking why the United States should continue to guarantee the security of Central Europe, including Poland. The U.S. does not guarantee Poland’s security out of altruism, but because a stable eastern flank of NATO lies in its strategic interest; it restrains Russia and strengthens the credibility of the American alliance system.
This approach is evident in various statements by U.S. representatives, including the recent statement by the U.S. ambassador to Poland, who said that America cannot be everywhere and always. This is not just about the current administration; I believe it is a general trend in the United States. I am aware of their internal problems; migration and economic challenges. The U.S. has simply decided to focus more on itself after playing the role of the world’s policeman for 80 years. It tried to be everywhere, intervening in all areas with a mission to defend democracy and Western civilization. Clearly, this mission now exceeds its capabilities. Therefore, it is abandoning the role of global gendarme, acknowledging that it’s most important interests lie on the other side of the Atlantic.
For Poland, and for Europe in general, it was a golden period when someone guaranteed our security, but now we must face reality. America is returning to focusing only on what is closest to it—here we can recall the Monroe Doctrine.
For this reason, the U.S. National Security Strategy, which angered many people, did not surprise me at all, because it contains exactly what Trump had been saying for years. Already during his first term, he stated that America must focus on its own interests and cannot do the dirty work for others. The National Security Strategy is simply putting this way of thinking on paper.
European countries relied exclusively on the United States for defence for many years, so this change in U.S. approach should be a lesson for us Europeans. Nevertheless, America is not leaving Europe. The strategy states that Europe remains a very important element of U.S. national consciousness and heritage, as well as an important economic partner. There is still a sense of unity with Europe—civilizationally, economically, and politically—and the Western community still exists. However, the U.S. needs partners, not protectorates for which it does everything. It clearly wants allies to be allies—equal partners—and wants European countries to take responsibility for their own defence, of course, under the American nuclear deterrence umbrella.
So, on this geopolitical chessboard—between the U.S., Russia, China, Arab countries, and developing states—is Europe playing united or divided?
What does Europe actually mean? Do we understand it as the European Union? If we look at the current confusion surrounding peace negotiations with Russia, we see a complete absence of European officials.
Kaja Kallas, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is not present in these discussions. The truth is that nation-states still dominate the world, as current crises show.
The European Union was and remains a good economic tool, but in political or military terms, it performs much worse. In my view, we should stick to the traditional division of responsibilities: the EU handles economic matters, and NATO handles security.
Some say that NATO’s formula is being exhausted by American actions and that the U.S. should limit its involvement. I disagree. NATO was created as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, and even as circumstances change, it remains the most effective military structure.
In fact, it is Russia that would benefit from NATO ceasing to exist. It remains crucial that Poland and countries in our region build their defensive capabilities. I recall the Ukrainian example—they are physically defending themselves against Russia.
Support from America and Europe in weapons and money was, of course, very important, but if they had not defended themselves, no one would have done it for them. We Poles must build our own defence capabilities by increasing the budget, through training, and through equipment purchases.
In your opinion, does it make no difference whether we buy weapons from the United States or South Korea, or would it be better to integrate Europe’s defence industry?
Arms purchases from the United States stemmed from the belief of some Polish politicians that buying American weapons would automatically translate into security guarantees. This is a very simplified way of thinking, although, of course, we should buy modern equipment, because the domestic defence industry is not currently able to independently produce the full spectrum of advanced military technologies.
At the same time, it is necessary to systematically develop our own production capabilities. This raises a key question: which countries will realistically be willing and able to meet Poland’s demand for modern military equipment? Spreading purchases among many suppliers may prove inefficient, generating problems with logistics, servicing, and implementation.
There is also the fundamental challenge of developing drone technologies. The war in Ukraine has shown that drones can significantly change the nature of armed conflict and neutralize numerical superiority, making them one of the key elements of modern defence strategy.
A good example of production cooperation between European countries is the partnership between the Leonardo Group and PZL-Świdnik, right? In that case, is it worth having partners in Europe?
Of course, the closer the defence industry is to us, the better; which is why it is important to build defence potential in Poland. Still, the American defence industry remains the best in the world, so it is good to draw from it.
In this renewed confrontation between the democratic West and Russia, what role does China play?
During the recent visit of Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow, aimed at negotiating a peace plan for Ukraine with Vladimir Putin, a Chinese deputy foreign minister was also present in the Russian capital at the same time. This was certainly no coincidence. China is not formally engaging militarily on Russia’s side, but it consistently supports it economically, driven primarily by its own trade and strategic interests.
China has operated for years with a long-term perspective, and one of its key goals is to gradually make Russia economically dependent on it, taking advantage of Western sanctions. Moscow increasingly replaces unavailable Western goods with Chinese products. The scale of this process is not fully known, but one gets the impression that some key Kremlin decisions are now made in consultation with Beijing.
At the same time, it must be remembered that China itself faces serious internal challenges; the consequences of the one-child policy, a rapidly aging population, the lack of a developed pension system, and a bursting real estate bubble. The list of structural problems in the Chinese economy is much longer. For this reason, Beijing is not interested in direct participation in armed conflicts in the near future. A far more advantageous strategy is to fuel international tensions while maintaining the position of an ostensibly neutral player that reaps political and economic benefits from global instability.
