Has the West Lost? by Prof. Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse

Why did the West lose?
In 2025, a book by Kishore Mahbubani appeared on the Polish publishing market under the telling title: Has the West Lost? (GlowBook Publishing). This Singaporean diplomat argues that the West—meaning primarily referring to the USA and the EU—was undone by overconfidence, arrogance, and disregard for former colonies, other civilizations, and cultures. Excessive greed was also a factor, especially the greed for short-term gainsgreed that ignored long-term consequences. This was tied to the West’s attachment to neoliberal capitalism, particularly in its financial dimension. There was also a lLack of geo-economic strategy also prevailed. Large American and European corporations relocated production to Asia, especially China, thereby strengthening the accumulation of capital and technology.—thus the This brought wealth and geo-economic potential ofto the Middle Kingdom— while simultaneously causing deindustrialization in the West, capital flight, and trade deficits.

I would also add that the West’s problem was a lack of consistency. Even when it engaged rivals, it did so ineffectively and unsystematically. A prime example was the U.S. wars in the Middle East, which Mahbubani considers a grave mistake. Nevertheless, once the decision was made to attack Muslim countries and fight Islamic terrorism, the West should not have simultaneously allowed mass Muslim immigration.

The same applies to encroaching on Moscow’s sphere of influence. Mahbubani criticizes NATO’s enlargement to include Central European states. Yet once the West expanded its influence at Russia’s expense, it should have been prepared to face Vladimir Putin’s revisionist policy.

Instead, the war of attrition over Ukraine, after three years, brought the announcement of U.S. withdrawal—not only from supporting Kyiv but also from maintaining American troops in Europe—and the delegation of responsibility for the war’s outcome and the continent’s security to Europeans themselves. In tThis way, Donald Trump weakened Europe’s security system, increased geopolitical instability, and effectively encouraged Putin to ramp up military pressure in the region.

Trump’s further “gifts” to Putin must be seen as the most telling example of the lack of strategic thinking in Western elites, and even more so of their inability to act consistently.

Another problem of Western elites was their excessive attachment to ideology, which drowned out rational thinking. First, this was tied to the dominance of neoliberal doctrine. It worked in relations with peripheral areas such as Central Europe but was a total failure with Asia, especially China. The West’s rejection of a practical geo-economic approach in favor of blind faith in the liberal market brought asymmetrical benefits to Beijing and painful losses for the U.S. and EU.

Later, Western actions were increasingly shaped by other liberal and leftist ideas linked to promoting democracy, human rights, ecology, and climate protection. These were meant to limit the East. The East, however, largely ignored these values and narratives or treated them pragmatically. Meanwhile, the very ideology the West promoted increasingly paralyzed its strategy and effective action. A good example is the EU’s and USA’s helplessness in the face of the migration crisis, as well as ideological zeal in climate policy. This was especially true in Europe, which turned out to be ever more advantageous for China, at the expense of EU competitiveness and geo-economic potential.

Mahbubani predicts the West’s defeat. He suggests that instead of continuing the struggle, the West—meaning the U.S. and Europe—should “gracefully” step down from the global stage and withdraw from its dominant position. They no longer have the potential to compete. Any aggressive attempt to change current trends will only end painfully and without success.

Rising China
There are many indications that the center of economic and political power is shifting eastward, above all to China. The country is increasingly becoming a geo-economic superpower and aspires to play a central role in shaping the new architecture of global economic globalization. Already, it is the world’s largest hub of trade exchange. What’s more, U.S. and EU protectionist and sanction policies are discouraging both private and state actors from using Western financial systems, Western capitals, and the U.S. dollar as the primary currency of international trade. Washington now finds itself dangerously close to losing the dollar’s primacy in the global economy, as well as the dominance of American financial institutions and technological leadership over non-Western powers.

Beijing is becoming the linchpin of geopolitical integration, as evidenced by the growing importance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). At the 2025 SCO summit in the Chinese city of Tianjin, 24 leaders from Asia, Africa, and Europe attended, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Particularly noteworthy was the participation of Turkey, a NATO member, as well as India’s leader, who has strong ties with the West and conflicting interests with Beijing.

Nevertheless, customs sanctions imposed on India by Trump led to a visible rapprochement between Modi and Xi Jinping. This has crucial implications for U.S. interests in Asia, since without Delhi’s support there is no effective way to balance Beijing’s growing geostrategic role in the region. The importance of the Tianjin summit was underscored by the presence of UN Secretary-General António Guterres, signaling China’s global relevance in international relations. Also present were the heads of ASEAN, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Economic Cooperation Organization, and several other regional bodies.

The SCO is viewed as a geopolitical alternative to Western structures such as the G7 or NATO and demonstrates China’s dominant role in shaping international structures rivaling the West.

China’s growing advantage over the West can be seen in one key area: access to strategic raw materials, especially rare earth elements. These are essential for modern industry, climate transition, and advanced weapons systems. China’s near-monopoly on processing these resources and its access to global reserves means that neither the U.S. nor the EU can afford a trade war with Beijing. As a result, they succumb to Chinese pressure.

Decline of U.S. Power
This dependence on raw materials best illustrates the weakness of Western geo-economic strategy. Another sign of weakness is the gradual loss of primacy, and thus influence, by the United States in international relations. Trump’s decision to impose sweeping sanctions on partners and allies triggered panic in financial markets and a serious loss of confidence in the U.S. dollar. This forced a rapid correction of policy by the U.S. president.

It is also increasingly evident that Washington is shifting geo-economic costs onto its allies, especially the EU, while also demanding economic, geopolitical, and financial concessions (a kind of tribute) from them. This points to the weakening of the hegemon, which now seeks to shore up its position not at the expense of its biggest rivals,—China and Russia, against whom the U.S. is too weak,—but at the expense of its allies. Initially, this created a sense of chaos among them, prompting radical concessions in the name of overarching security goals. But in the longer term, once America’s loss of primacy becomes undeniable, and as the U.S. withdraws from more areas of dominance (not only in Europe but also in Asia and the Pacific), allies may change course. They may stop entrusting their fate unconditionally to Washington and instead deepen regional cooperation—or perhaps even turn toward other powers, especially China.

Trump’s helplessness in the Ukraine conflict, demonstrated by failed attempts to end it, is proof of America’s structural weakness. Even more telling is the desire to withdraw militarily from Europe, and delegate responsibility for the continent’s security to Europeans. Similarly, the U.S. might stop defending Taiwan,—or even other Asian allies, such as South Korea or Japan. Should American elites follow Mahbubani’s advice, the U.S. could return to a strategy reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine of the 19th century, restricting its influence to the Americas and leaving Eurasia to China, or to China and Russia. Such a move could help America rebuild its strength and focus on new priorities, such as space competition. Yet, it would sooner or later spark conflict over dividing America’s geopolitical legacy among Moscow, Beijing, and possibly Berlin.

For now, Washington is too weak to prevent China’s increasingly likely dominance in the new phase of economic globalization. Historical roles have reversed: Ttoday, Communist China defends economic globalization, while capitalist America undermines it. Trump’s attempts to rebuild U.S. competitiveness and reindustrialize, as well as reduce debt and the trade deficit, face serious obstacles —and success is far from guaranteed.

Marginalization of the European Union
The weakest link in the current geopolitical constellation is the European Union. It is increasingly dependent on the U.S. for security, and geo-economically dependent on China. Given Beijing’s influence over Moscow’s actions, continental Europe may soon also become dependent on China for its security.

Europe’s economic competitiveness has been declining for decades, while debt has been skyrocketing. This weakens the EU’s international standing .and This demonstrates the importance of geo-economic mechanisms—the role of economic potential in shaping a geopolitical power.

Europe is also militarily weak. Without the U.S., it cannot effectively deter Russia, at least not in the near future. This deepens the continent’s geopolitical degradation. Once central powers in the global order, Western European states are now becoming the periphery of world powers such as China and the U.S. Using Immanuel Wallerstein’s terminology, they occupy a semi-peripheral position in the global system. They remain a “center” for internal EU peripheries such as Central Europe, —but globally, they are increasingly marginalized.

A Multipolar Order?
The global international system is deeply unstable and far from ordered. Four main powers currently matter: China, the U.S., India, and Russia.

It is difficult to include the EU —or any single Western European state —in this group. Among these four powers, there are, of course, interdependencies, but above all, competition over the future shape of the international order. Moscow is increasingly subordinate to Beijing, even if it gains an edge over the EU, thanks to the Ukraine war. Still, it also faces challenges in its relations with China, notably competition for influence in Central Asia. Moreover, Beijing will not tolerate excessive Russian expansion westward, while Russian elites will not, in the long run, accept a subordinate role to China. This foreshadows an eventual confrontation between the two.

There are also many conflicting interests between China and India, even though, for now, Delhi refuses to commit fully to either side—the West or the Beijing-led East. This already shows the emergence of two rival blocs: the Western one under Washington’s leadership, and the alternative being built by Beijing.

The European Union is weakening. It is becoming more an object of great power politics than an independent actor. The same is increasingly true for other regions of the world, which are becoming arenas of rivalry, spheres of clientelism, or zones of non-alignment. Thus, the situation of multipolarity is illusory or transitional. It marks a period of chaos and deep instability in the international order that will likely last at least a dozen years. In the future, we are headed toward either a bipolar system or a hegemonic one. This does not exclude the possibility that some states—or even entire continents—will remain areas of rivalry, dependency, or non-involvement. The main antagonists remain the U.S. and China.